Competition Policy and the Application of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act by Kovacic, William E. & Winerman, Mark
GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works Faculty Scholarship 
2010 
Competition Policy and the Application of Section 5 of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act 
William E. Kovacic 
George Washington University Law School, wkovacic@law.gwu.edu 
Mark Winerman 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/faculty_publications 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
William E. Kovacic & Marc Winerman, Competition Policy and the Application of Section 5 of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act, 20 Minn. J. Int'l L. 274 (2010). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarly Commons. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works by an authorized administrator of 
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact spagel@law.gwu.edu. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1953506
COMPETITION POLICY AND THE APPLICATION OF
SECTION 5 OF THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION ACT
WILLIAM E. KOVACIC
MARC WINERMAN*
Since the mid-1970s, the U.S. courts generally have narrowed the
range of single-firm behavior subject to condemnation under Section 2
of the Sherman Act1 as attempted monopolization or monopolization.2
The intervention skepticism reflected in modern U.S. antitrust jurispru-
dence has inspired some commentators to consider the possibility that
the Federal Trade Commission increase the use of Section 5 of the Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act,3 which forbids unfair methods of competi-
tion (“unfair methods” or UMC), to challenge single firm conduct
without relying directly on an underlying violation of Section 2. As inter-
preted by the U.S. courts, Section 5 enables the FTC to proscribe behav-
ior beyond conduct prohibited by the other federal antitrust statutes,
including Section 2.4 Commentators have suggested that, among other
* William Kovacic is a Commissioner with the Federal Trade Commission and Profes-
sor at the George Washington University Law School (on leave). Marc Winerman is an
Attorney Advisor to Commissioner Kovacic. The views expressed here are those of the
authors alone. The authors are grateful for many useful comments from participants at
the University of Haifa conference, May 24-25, 2009, as well as to Thomas Krattenmaker.
1 15 U.S.C. § 2.
2 These trends are examined in ANDREW I. GAVIL ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPEC-
TIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 582–762 (2d ed. 2008); Wil-
liam E. Kovacic & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal Thinking, 14
J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 2000, at 43, 54–58. For Supreme Court decisions in this decade
that have relaxed restrictions on dominant firm conduct, see Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine
Commc’ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109 (2009), Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood
Lumber Co.,  549 U.S. 312 (2007); and Verizon Commc’n, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V.
Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
3 15 U.S.C. § 45.
4 See Neil W. Averitt, The Meaning of “Unfair Methods of Competition” in Section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act, 21 B.C. L. REV. 227, 239–40 (1980) (discussing Supreme
Court’s interpretation of Section 5 and its endorsement of the capacity of Section 5 to
reach beyond boundaries of other federal antitrust statutes).
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consequences, a jurisprudence predicated on Section 5 would facilitate
convergence with approaches used to implement Article 102 of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (formerly Article 82
of the European Treaty).5
In this article, we examine possibilities for the FTC to develop cases
that are not premised on Sherman Act doctrine and instead apply dis-
tinctive Section 5 principles to address apparent instances of anticompe-
titive conduct. (For purposes of this article, references to the Sherman
Act include the Clayton Act.) Initially, we lay out the rationale for using
Section 5 to address conduct beyond the reach of prevailing concepts
under the Sherman Act. We then set out cautions that should accom-
pany expanded reliance on Section 5 as an antitrust enforcement instru-
ment. We conclude by presenting what we believe to be institutional
prerequisites for broader application of Section 5. Among other steps,
we see a need for the Commission, as a foundation for future litigation,
to issue a policy statement that sets out a framework for the application
of Section 5. We also offer some elements of what such a framework
should include. In this article we focus chiefly on dominant firm behav-
ior, but our observations apply as well to other forms of conduct.
I. SECTION 5 AND THE CASE FOR ITS
EXPANDED APPLICATION
Section 5 of the FTC Act, with its prohibition upon unfair methods,
was integral to establishment of the Commission in 1914.6 Congress in-
tended Section 5 to be a mechanism for upgrading the U.S. system of
competition law by permitting the FTC to reach behavior not necessarily
proscribed by the other U.S. competition statutes, including the 1890
Sherman Act and the Clayton Act.7 Section 5 would be applied by an
expert administrative tribunal which had power to impose prospective
equitable relief (not monetary remedies or criminal sanctions), whose
5 See, e.g., Thomas A. Miller & Ryan W. Marth, Promoting Greater Consistency in Sin-
gle Party Conduct: Is Section 5 of the FTC Act a “Third Way” to Converge European and
U.S. Interests? (June 18, 2009) (unpublished paper presented at the American Antitrust
Institute’s 10th Annual Conference) (discussing how application of Section 5 might per-
mit development of more intervention-oriented policies), available at http://www.anti
trustinstitute.org/archives/files/Marth%20Miller%20Convergence%20Article_07142009
1600.pdf; Albert A. Foer, Section 5 as a Bridge Toward Convergence, Presentation at the
FTC Workshop on Section 5 of the FTC Act as a Competition Statute (Oct. 17, 2008),
available at  http://www.ftc.gov/bc/workshops/section5/docs/afoer.pdf.
6 The FTC’s creation and the role of Section 5 in its establishment are examined in
Marc Winerman, The Origins of the FTC: Concentration, Cooperation, Control, and Competition,
71 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 58–92 (2003).
7 The Clayton Act became law less than three weeks after the FTC Act in 1914. Id. at
92.
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decisions interpreting Section 5 would not have collateral effects in pri-
vate litigation and whose work would be reviewed by appellate courts
under a deferential standard.
Five principal motivations inspired this legislative choice. One was the
fear that the Sherman Act, at least as applied by the courts, would be too
narrow to address the “trust” problem.8 The second was the desire to
introduce an administrative mechanism that could adjust the bounda-
ries of acceptable business conduct in light of evolving business prac-
tices and developments in economic and legal understanding.9 In effect,
Section 5 would serve as an expansion joint in the U.S. competition pol-
icy system. The third was to locate that authority in a body that could
conduct investigations and prepare studies as well as bring administra-
tive cases, so that Section 5 litigation would be embedded in a broad
understanding of business practices and their implications.10 The fourth
was to create a policy instrument that would be relatively independent
of control by the Executive Branch and would be more responsive to
legislative preferences.11 The fifth was to embed the Commission’s
broad authority in a regime with lighter-handed penalties than those
available under the Sherman Act.
8 JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 32–34 (1938) (observing that “there
was widespread distrust of the courts’ ability to evolve workable concepts to direct the
economic forces” that had created competition policy problems and stating that this “dis-
trust based itself upon the belief that the men who composed our judiciary too often held
economic and social opinions opposed to the ideals of their time”); Averitt, supra note 4,
at 233–34.
9 See Report of the Senate Comm. on Interstate Commerce, S. REP. NO. 63-597, at 9 (1914),
reprinted in 5 THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AND RELATED
STATUTES, PART I (Earl W. Kintner ed., 1982) [hereinafter KINTNER] (“The proper en-
forcement of the Sherman law also requires vigilant supervision which is most effectively
obtained by a body in continual touch with the business organizations in the various in-
dustries.”); id. at 13 (explaining the rationale for enacting “a general declaration con-
demning unfair practices” and authorizing an administrative commission “to determine
what practices were unfair”); 51 CONG REC. 11,083 (Senator Newlands observing that
Commission would be composed of eminent lawyers and economists, experienced busi-
nessmen, and publicists; id. at 11,090 (1914) (Senator Newlands observing that, if twenty
improper practices were specified today, more would be developed tomorrow.).
10 REPORT OF THE SENATE COMM. ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE, S. REP. NO. 63-597, at 10
(KINTNER, supra note 9, at 8–9) (explaining the need for a body with the “information,
experience, and careful study of the business and economic conditions of the industry
affected”).
11 See ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, 1 MONOGRAPH NO. 5, THE FTC AS AN ANTITRUST EN-
FORCEMENT AGENCY: THE ROLE OF SECTION 5 IN THE FTC ACT IN ANTITRUST LAW 20–25
(1981) (discussing institutional aims that led Congress to establish the FTC). Senator Al-
bert Cummins, one of the leading advocates for the creation of the FTC, said, “If we find
that the people are betrayed either through dishonesty or through mistaken opinion, the
commission is always subordinate to Congress. . . . Congress can always destroy the com-
mission; it can repeal the law which creates it . . . .” 51 CONG. REC. 13,047–48 (1914).
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As conceived in 1914, the FTC’s administrative powers under Section
5 incorporated a significant trade-off. The Commission’s power to shape
doctrine would be relatively broad and would include the authority to
arrest conduct not previously condemned by prevailing interpretations
of the Sherman Act. Its remedial authority would be relatively light
handed and include the capacity to impose only equitable remedies.12
In theory, Section 5 had the potential to help make the Commission
the preeminent vehicle for setting competition policy in the United
States.13 Through repeated exposure to competition policy problems,
the FTC would use distinctive research and data collection powers to
develop, apply, and assess doctrine. Expert commissioners would deter-
mine the appropriate standards of liability and business over time would
conform to those standards,14 and courts would eventually look to the
Commission for guidance about how to frame and apply antitrust
rules.15 By this design, there was the possibility that the Department of
12 Until 1938, the only remedy available to the Commission for a violation of an agency
order was to seek a separate enforcement order from a court of appeals. FTC Act, Pub. L.
No. 63-204, § 5, 38 Stat. 717, 719–721 (1914). The Commission obtained the authority to
seek civil penalties for Section 5 order violations in 1938. Wheeler-Lea Act, Pub. L. No. 75-
447, § 3, 52 Stat. 111, 114 (1938), amending FTC Act § 5, 52 Stat. 111, 114.
13 This was the expectation of some of the FTC Act’s principal sponsors. Shortly before
Congress passed the legislation in 1914, Senator Cummins predicted that the FTC “will be
found to be the most efficient protection to the people of the United States that Congress
has ever given the people by way of a regulation of commerce.” 51 CONG. REC. 14,770
(1914).
14 Senator Francis Newlands, one of the FTC Act’s chief sponsors, noted during the
legislative debates in 1914 that “as a result of investigation and as the result of long experi-
ence [the FTC] will build up a body of information and of administrative law that will be
of service not only to [it] but to the country itself, and that gradually standards will be
established that will be accepted and will constitute our code of business morals.” 51
CONG. REC. 11,083 (1914).
15 The legislative history contains mixed indications of whether Congress intended Sec-
tion 5 UMC to reach conduct within the letter of the Sherman Act at all. See Averitt, supra
note 4, at 238 (noting that application of antitrust laws to conduct that could have been
successfully challenged under the Sherman Act finds less support in the legislative history
than do most other types of Section 5 violations). The Commerce Committee’s initial
report highlighted that the Commission would not interfere with Justice Department en-
forcement of the Sherman Act. S. REP. NO. 63-597, supra note 10, at 10 (Commission
would have power “ancillary to the Department of Justice to aid materially and practically
in the enforcement of the Sherman law . . . .”). Senator Cummins anticipated that the
Commission would refer Sherman Act cases to the Department. 51 CONG. REC. 11,529
(1914). Senator Henry Hollis, one of the principal proponents of Section 5, offered a
different emphasis. See Winerman, supra note 6, at 79–80. Hollis observed that the DOJ
would be able to focus on “the great task of prosecuting suits for the dissolution of mo-
nopolies, leaving to the trade commission the important service of policing competition,
so as to protect small business men, keep an open field for new enterprise, and prevent
the development of trusts.” 51 CONG. REC. 12,146. George Rublee, one of the original
Commissioners and a key player in persuading Woodrow Wilson to endorse Section 5,
believed that Section 5 had at most limited overlap with the Sherman Act; it reached “acts
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Justice would gravitate toward focusing on the prosecution of offenses
deemed suitable for criminal punishment, along with some major mo-
nopolization cases.16 Other civil law enforcement would become the
province of the FTC, and the flexibility inherent in Section 5 and the
Commission’s other institutional features would be a major reason for
its specialized role.
In practice, the FTC’s application of Section 5 has played a compara-
tively insignificant role in shaping U.S. competition policy. Since enact-
ment of the FTC Act in 1914, the adjudication of cases premised on the
Sherman Act, rather than upon the FTC Act, has provided the main
vehicle for setting boundaries for business behavior. The treatment of
dominant firm conduct illustrates the point. The Supreme Court last
examined the FTC’s application of Section 5 to address allegations of
improper exclusion by a dominant firm in 1927 (when it ruled against
the Commission).17 Dominant firm cases litigated under Sherman Act
theories overwhelmingly provide the frame of reference by which courts
assess firm conduct, attorneys advise clients, and antitrust professors
teach students.18 One would be hard-pressed to come up with a list of
ten adjudicated decisions that involved the FTC’s application of Section
of competition,” but not “agreements or combinations, prohibited by the Sherman Act,
which limit or put an end to competition between the parties.” George Rublee, Book Re-
view, 38 HARV. L. REV. 269 (1924) (reviewing GERARD C. HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION (1924)). In any event, the Commission was soon bringing administrative
cases that could have been brought under the Sherman Act. By 1922, in finding a Section
5 violation in a resale price maintenance case, the Supreme Court highlighted that the
challenged conduct “goes far beyond” what the Sherman Act would allow; the Court then
modified the Commission’s order in ways that seemed intended to hew more closely to
Sherman Act. FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441, 453–54 (1922).
16 Perhaps the least used provision of the FTC Act is Section 7, which authorizes the
Commission to serve as a special master to assist the court in formulating remedies in
complex cases. 15 U.S.C. § 47.
17 FTC v. Eastman Kodak Co., 274 U.S. 619 (1927). In the 1950s and 1960s, the Su-
preme Court did take a number of Commission cases involving the conduct of a respon-
dent towards its merchandisers. In the last case to reach the Supreme Court, FTC v.
Texaco, Inc., 393 U.S. 223 (1968), Texaco had entered into contracts with manufacturers
of tires, batteries, and accessories pursuant to which Texaco received commissions and by
virtue of which Texaco pressed its dealers to sell those manufacturers’ products. In its
decision, the Court emphasized that Texaco “holds dominant economic power over its
dealers.” Id. at 226. The Court endorsed the FTC’s decision to use Section 5 to condemn
Texaco’s efforts to induce its dealers to purchase specified brands of tires, batteries, and
accessories. Id. at 231.
18 Since 1914, there have been courts of appeals decisions involving dominant firm
conduct challenged under Section 5 of the FTC Act, but these have been rare. See, e.g.,
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984); Boise Cascade Corp.
v. FTC, 637 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1980); Official Airline Guides v. FTC, 630 F.2d 920 (2d Cir.
1980).
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5 in which the FTC prevailed and the case can be said to have had a
notable impact, either in terms of doctrine or economic effects.19
Several factors explain why Section 5 has played so small a role in the
development of U.S. competition policy principles. Probably the most
important is that the Sherman Act proved to be a far more flexible tool
for setting antitrust rules than Congress expected in the early 20th cen-
tury. For example, the potential elasticity of the Sherman Act’s prohibi-
tion on monopolization and attempted monopolization became
apparent in the period that began in 1945 with the decision in United
States v. Aluminum Company of America (Alcoa),20 and extended into the
mid- to late-1970s.21 Alcoa and subsequent decisions, such as American
Tobacco Co. v. United States,22 United States v. Griffith,23 and United States v.
United Shoe Machinery Corp.24 suggested that the Sherman Act would
reach an especially wide range of business behavior.25 Scholarly com-
mentary in the 1970s also proposed that Section 2 could encompass “no-
fault” theories of liability that would treat persistent, durable monopoly
power that was unrelated to superior performance as an infringement
without proof of bad acts.26
These doctrinal trends raised questions about the utility of Section 5.
There seemed little need for the elasticity of Section 5 when the Sher-
19 Our own list of adjudicated matters in which the Commission relied on Section 5,
prevailed, and achieved important doctrinal or economic results would be led by FTC v.
Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948) (upholding FTC challenge, predicated upon Section
1 of the Sherman Act and Section 5 of the FTC Act, to base-point pricing scheme)—if not
for the subsequent fate of that case. See infra text accompanying note 66.
20 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
21 More than any other case from the 1970s, Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603
F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), marked a rethinking of more expansive enforcement approaches
that Alcoa had set in motion in the 1940s. See ERNEST GELLHORN, WILLIAM E. KOVACIC &
STEPHEN CALKINS, ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS IN A NUTSHELL 153–54 (5th ed. 2004)
(discussing significance of Berkey Photo).
22 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
23 334 U.S. 100 (1948).
24 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff’d per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
25 See, e.g., Eugene Rostow, The New Sherman Act: A Positive Instrument of Progress, 14 U.
CHI. L. REV. 567, 577 (1947) (Alcoa and American Tobacco “mark the new birth of Section
2.”); Edward H. Levi, The Antitrust Laws and Monopoly, 14 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 183 (1947)
(“Today . . . as a result of an increased awareness of the monopoly problem, and as a
result of the Alcoa and American Tobacco decisions we appear to have a new interpretation
of the [Sherman] Act, closer probably to its original intention, which can give the act
strength against monopolies as such, and also against control by three, four or five corpo-
rations acting together.”).
26 The most notable scholarly contribution supporting the application of no-fault theo-
ries of liability under Section 2 of the Sherman Act was 3 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F.
TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶ 614–623 (1978). The history of post-World War II no-fault
monopolization proposals is sketched in GAVIL ET AL., supra note 2, at 620–21.
2010] SECTION 5 OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT 1007
man Act was proving to be so elastic itself. In the period when courts
were interpreting the Sherman and Clayton Acts expansively, it was not
evident what useful contribution the capacity of Section 5 to reach still
further would add to the mix. The Supreme Court had affirmed the
FTC’s authority to use Section 5 to prohibit behavior beyond the reach
of the Sherman Act, but it was unclear if Section 5 could come into play
except in relatively rare circumstances.
One possible application would be to fill gaps in coverage, such as to
prohibit invitations to collude that neither constituted unlawful agree-
ments within the reach of Section 1 of the Sherman Act nor violated the
Sherman Act Section 2 ban on attempted monopolization. Such applica-
tions would serve to condemn behavior that posed the same competitive
dangers as conduct proscribed by the other antitrust statutes yet evaded
effective control because it lacked some characteristic required by these
measures. Among other hurdles, FTC cases seeking to serve this gap-
filling function would have to overcome arguments that Congress pur-
posefully created the gaps in question and did not intend that Section 5
be used to cure deliberate omissions in the coverage provided by the
Sherman and Clayton Acts.
Another possible application of Section 5 in a period of expansive
Supreme Court readings of the other antitrust laws would be to extend
still further a zone of prohibition that already reflected a strongly in-
terventionist orientation. This arguably is what the Commission sought
to do in its challenge to the exclusive dealing practices at issue in FTC v.
Brown Shoe Co.27 The Commission relied on Section 5 to proscribe exclu-
sive dealing contracts (terminable at will by either party) that affected
766 of the nation’s 70,000 retailers classified as retail shoe outlets.28 The
Eighth Circuit refused to enforce the Commission’s order and ridiculed
the agency’s reasoning.29 The Supreme Court upheld the FTC’s ruling
and endorsed the agency’s position that the exclusive dealing agree-
ments infringed Section 5 of the FTC Act, regardless of whether they
violated the other antitrust statutes.30
27 384 U.S. 316 (1966).
28 Brown Shoe Co., 62 F.T.C. 679, 715–27 (1963). The Commission also found that the
challenged practice violated “the standards of illegality under Section 3 and Section 7 of
the Clayton Act.” Id. at 717.
29 Brown Shoe Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 45, at 55 (8th Cir. 1964).
30 Brown Shoe, 384 U.S. at 322. The court of appeals decision had been so damning of
the Commission’s analysis and scornful of its interpretation of Section 5 that the Supreme
Court may have perceived that the very legitimacy of the agency’s basic charter was at
stake and consequently may have felt compelled to come to the FTC’s defense.
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The Commission’s Brown Shoe decision, issued in 1963, viewed the Su-
preme Court’s merger decision one year earlier in Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States31 as endorsing close scrutiny of vertical foreclosures of less
than one percent;32 warranting efforts to give heavy weight to concentra-
tion levels that, by current standards, would be seen as innocuous;33 and
endorsing the subordination of economic efficiency aims to attain a
more egalitarian business environment.34 The FTC interpreted the Su-
preme Court’s Brown Shoe merger decision and cases such as United States
v. Aluminum Co. of America35 as mandates to extend the reach of antitrust
oversight, and it viewed its application of Section 5 in the Brown Shoe
exclusive dealing case as a natural and appropriate extension of the
principles of the Court’s modern Clayton Act and Sherman Act
jurisprudence.
The Commission’s Brown Shoe opinion reveals no apprehension that
the prevailing jurisprudence of the period perhaps had established a
zone of liability under the Clayton and Sherman Acts that was so expan-
sive that it required no further extension through Section 5. We cannot
recreate the internal deliberations that animated the agency’s decision
to prosecute or its resolution of the case. It is conceivable that if the
Commission believed Section 5 obliged it to add something distinctive
31 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
32 Brown Shoe, 62 F.T.C. at 716–17.
33 The Commission’s decision observed:
The structure of the industry is significant. Although there are a large number
of shoe manufacturers, a few companies occupy a commanding position. Of the
approximately 1,000 shoe manufacturers in 1959, the top 70 manufacturers ac-
counted for approximately 54 percent of the shoe production in that year. The
5 largest manufacturers, it should be noted, produced 24 percent of total pairs
of shoes produced in 1959 and their production further constituted 45 percent
of the product manufactured by the top 70 manufacturers.
Id. at 717–18.
The Commission did not assign a specific market share to Brown Shoe. In the Brown
Shoe merger decision, which examined structural conditions existing at the time of the
exclusive dealing plan challenged in the FTC’s case, the Supreme Court found that the
combined shares of production of Brown Shoe and Kinney totaled 5 percent. Brown Shoe,
370 U.S. at 302–03.
34 The agency’s decision stated,
In assessing the need for Commission action . . . we must take account of the
fact that historically one of the purposes of the antitrust laws, over and above
purely economic considerations, has been to preserve “. . . an organization of
industry in small units which can effectively compete with each other. . . .” To
foster the competitive position of the smaller manufacturers, Brown should be
prohibited from entering into arrangements with its customers interfering with
the latter’s independent judgment in making purchasing decisions.
Id. at 720 (citing United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir. 1945);
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962)).
35 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
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to antitrust jurisprudence, it may have felt an institutional imperative to
press doctrine outward, even in a period of expansive judicial interpreta-
tions of the other antitrust laws.
In the midst of the expansive doctrinal construction of the Clayton
and Sherman Acts though, the Supreme Court also opened the door to
a particularly broad interpretation of Section 5. In 1972, in FTC v. Sperry
& Hutchinson Co. (S&H),36 the Court said that Section 5 enables the
Commission to reach conduct prohibited by the other antitrust laws,
conduct that infringes the spirit of these laws, and even some conduct
that violates neither the letter nor the spirit of the other statutes.37 S&H
was not the only case during the expansion of Sherman Act jurispru-
dence in which the Court defined Section 5 broadly. In the late 1940s,
in FTC v. Cement Institute,38 the Court had suggested that Section 5 use-
fully could address facilitating practices or other scenarios involving
tacit coordination where the facts might not support a finding of con-
certed action needed to satisfy the agreement requirement of Section 1
of the Sherman Act.
As noted above, the general trend toward expansion in the interpreta-
tion of Sherman Act jurisprudence that began in the 1940s ended in the
late 1970s. This is particularly evident in the treatment of dominant
firms. Beginning roughly with the court of appeals’ decision in Berkey
Photo39 in 1979 and continuing to the present, judicial rulings in Section
2 cases generally have narrowed the limits on single-firm behavior. Dom-
inant firms today enjoy considerably more freedom under U.S. law than
they did thirty years ago to select pricing, product development, and
marketing tactics.
Three intellectual forces have propelled Section 2 doctrine in pro-
gressively more permissive directions. The first is a literature that offers
benign or procompetitive explanations for behavior once treated with
suspicion when practiced by a dominant firm. A major example is preda-
tory pricing, where advocates of a “no rule” approach and proponents of
limited scrutiny have persuaded courts to limit severely the circum-
stances in which a dominant firm’s decision to drop prices in the face of
entry or expansion by a rival can be condemned.40 The path in Supreme
36 405 U.S. 233 (1972).
37 Id. at 239–44.
38 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
39 Berkey Photo Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979).
40 See William E. Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of Modern U.S. Competition Law for Dominant
Firm Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix, 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 43–51 (dis-
cussing influence of modern scholarship on predatory pricing doctrine).
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Court decisions that started with Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co.41
in the 1960s and carries forward to Weyerhaeuser42 in this decade under-
scores the point.
The second stimulus for retrenchment has been the concern that the
U.S. style of private rights of action poses unacceptable risks of
overdeterrence, especially when used to challenge behavior that poses a
seemingly complex mix of procompetitive and anticompetitive attrib-
utes.43 From the late 1970s to the present, the federal courts have em-
braced the view, stated most famously in the work of Phillip Areeda and
Donald Turner, that limits upon dominant firm conduct ought to be
applied cautiously lest errors in the formulation and application of legal
rules in private cases (especially where jury trials were the norm) would
create unwarranted, disproportionate, and unavoidable treble damage
liability for behavior that either was legitimate or was improper only by a
narrow margin.44 Modern Supreme Court decisions that have restricted
the reach of the Sherman Act in Section 1 and Section 2 cases have
emphasized this theme.45
The third force, closely related to the first two, is the concern with
what Areeda and Turner termed “administrability.”46 This concept en-
compasses two ideas. The first is that legal rules should be stated with
sufficient clarity to permit sensible implementation, especially in private
suits that are conducted before courts of general jurisdiction and often
are tried before juries.47 The second, related idea is that the application
of competition rules ought to account for the capability, including the
relative capabilities, of the institutions responsible for their implementa-
tion. At one time, manifest in decisions such as Otter Tail Power Co. v.
United States48 and lower court cases involving claims that AT&T had en-
gaged in illegal monopolization,49 the federal courts were skeptical
about the ability of controls contained in various forms of sectoral regu-
41 386 U.S. 685 (1967).
42 Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312 (2007).
43 Kovacic, supra note 40, at 51–64. R
44 Id.
45 See, e.g., NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 136–37 (1998) (“To apply the
per se rule here . . . would transform cases involving business behavior that is improper
for various reasons, say, cases involving nepotism or personal pique, into treble-damages
antitrust cases.”).
46 Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section
2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1975).
47 Id. at 699.
48 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
49 See United States v. AT&T Corp., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d sub nom. Mary-
land v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
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lation to provide adequate limits on dominant firm discretion.50 Recent
decisions such as Trinko,51 Credit Suisse,52 and linkLine53 reflect a different
assessment of the relative strengths of regulatory oversight and antitrust
enforcement as means of controlling dominant firms.
The intervention skepticism of modern jurisprudence involving domi-
nant firms and the intellectual foundations for cautious application of
Section 2 have drawn attention back to Section 5 of the FTC Act. If
Section 5 as a distinctive source of liability has limited utility in periods
of Sherman Act doctrinal expansion, what happens when the reach of
the Sherman Act shrinks, and shrinks dramatically? This is a worthy sub-
ject for discussion when the acute fear of the courts about overreaching
in private litigation is spurring adjustments in substantive standards that
encumber public litigants as well. Public agencies now must meet liabil-
ity tests that the courts have set to cope with what is perceived to be
disproportionate treble damage exposure. In bringing their own Sec-
tion 2 cases, public agencies today must satisfy liability standards that
have been set to deal with overdeterrence hazards that the public agen-
cies do not pose.
To the extent that the drive toward cautious application of the Sher-
man Act rests upon considerations of administrative capacity, Section 5
again provides a possible institutional solution. Compared to the typical
federal court, the FTC offers a superior platform for elaborating compe-
tition policy, and particularly for policy toward dominant firms. It has
tools to perform empirical and policy work that can inform the design
of legal rules. In its routine operations, it is a specialized tribunal whose
decisions under Section 5 have no collateral effect in private cases. In
principal, administrative elaboration of doctrine by the FTC, subject to
judicial review, should ameliorate many of the concerns that accompany
the private litigation of antitrust cases before generalist courts.54
50 See William E. Kovacic, Accounting for Regulation in Determining the Application of Anti-
trust Rules to Firms Subject to Public Utility Oversight, 40 ANTITRUST BULL. 483, 496 (1995)
(discussing how courts in antitrust cases regarded the effectiveness of public utility
regulation).
51 Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
52 Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264 (2007).
53 Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Commc’ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109 (2009).
54 While it might ameliorate those concerns, however, it would not address the poten-
tial to incorporate Commission UMC law into the construction of state laws with their
own UMC provisions. Many states have statutes, modeled on the FTC Act, that prohibit
unfair methods of competition (as well as unfair or deceptive acts or practices). The fed-
eral and state systems do not operate in watertight compartments. As commentators have
documented, the federal and state regimes are interdependent. See, e.g., DEE PRIDGEN &
RICHARD M. ALDERMAN, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE LAW 143–52 (2009–2010 ed.)
(discussing use of FTC precedent to interpret state consumer protection statutes); Law-
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II. CAUTIONS FROM HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE
There are strong conceptual bases, outlined above, for U.S. competi-
tion policy system to rely more heavily upon administrative elaboration
of Section 5 of the FTC Act to address claims of improper exclusion.
These bases provide good reason to consider how Section 5 might sup-
ply a superior basis for the development of principles for single firm
conduct.
There also is a cautionary history that ought to inform discussions
about how fast, how far, and by what means the FTC might expand its
use of Section 5 as an alternative to Section 2 litigation before the fed-
eral courts. FTC experience with Section 5 is generally a bleak record. It
features few episodes of success in using Section 5 to establish distinctive
competition policy jurisprudence with respect to single firm conduct or
other forms of behavior. The Commission must confront this history
directly and understand why the list of failures is considerably longer
than the list of accomplishments.
The FTC’s success in achieving durable, influential adjustments in
doctrine through Section 5 jurisprudence can best be measured
through a simple inquiry: How often do appellate courts endorse FTC
efforts to premise liability on Section 5 theories?55
This definition of accomplishment discounts the importance of con-
sent decrees premised upon Section 5 theories. Firms and their counsel-
ors must and do pay attention to consent decrees, for settlements can be
important signs of the Commission’s enforcement intentions. Settle-
ments also can be a way to test and gain acceptance for a theory. At least
indirectly, such support might create a more accepting environment
rence Fullerton et al., Reliance on FTC Consumer Protection Law Precedents in Other Legal
Forums (ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Working Paper No. 1, July 1988) (describing how
FTC consumer protection actions inform application of state law). State laws modeled on
the FTC Act can include private causes of action, including private causes of action with
multiple damages and attorneys’ fees.
55 The FTC’s success in developing a unique Section 5 jurisprudence is only one mea-
sure of its success as a competition enforcement agency. Most UMC cases are expressly
premised on an underlying Sherman Act theory. For those cases, a comparable inquiry
would examine the extent to which the Commission has influenced broader antitrust
doctrine. It would consider, for example, the impact of the Commission’s analysis of how
to conduct a rule of reason analysis, which was endorsed on judicial review, PolyGram
Holdings, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29 (D.C. Cir. 2005), and has influenced other courts. Fur-
ther, a fuller analysis would consider the Commission’s influence on policy and conduct
through its research mission, consumer education, foreign and domestic advocacy, and
other tools. See generally WILLIAM E. KOVACIC, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AT 100:
INTO OUR 2ND CENTURY (2009) (report by FTC Chairman on the results of the FTC’s self-
study), available at http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/workshops/ftc100/docs/ftc100rpt.pdf.
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when the federal courts review a future FTC decision that employs the
concepts embodied in prior consents.
As influences on doctrine and firm behavior, though, settlements are
weak substitutes for decisions by the appellate courts that affirm FTC
rulings based on Section 5. One can have confidence in a theory’s
power and durability only when it has been tested in adversarial pro-
ceedings and endorsed by reviewing courts (and respondents who con-
test an administrative complaint before the agency will generally seek
judicial review if the agency rules against them).56 The consent decree
achieved by the FTC in N-Data57 is interesting, but the concept applied
there becomes truly significant only if and when it ultimately prevails in
a contested matter and survives review in the appellate process.
The FTC’s record of appellate litigation involving applications of Sec-
tion 5 that go beyond prevailing interpretations of the other antitrust
laws is uninspiring. The cases of greatest interest are those in which the
Commission expressly disavowed reliance on Sherman Act jurispru-
dence and indicated that it was attempting to reach conduct not prohib-
ited by the other statutes. Aside from S&H, complexities of which are
discussed below, one needs to go back to the 1960s to find cases in
which the Commission succeeded on appeal in a case applying a Section
5 theory. These would be matters such as the tires, batteries, and acces-
sories cases involving Texaco and Atlantic Refining,58 which involved var-
iants of tying, and the exclusive dealing prosecution of Brown Shoe.59
To this list one might add Brunswick/Yamaha, which approved the FTC’s
use of Clayton Act Section 7 and FTC Section 5 theories to nullify a joint
venture.60 In the period before the 1960s, the list of FTC appellate suc-
cesses is short as well.
56 In addition to the lack of a judicial screen, settling respondents may have less interest
in the doctrine reflected in the complaint than in the limitations on conduct imposed by
the order, while the Commission’s priorities might be more weighted to the doctrinal
implications. In particular, a respondent who is otherwise inclined to settle a case may
have little incentive to resist an alternative theory of liability that leads to no additional
order provisions.
57 See Negotiated Data Solutions LLC, FTC No. C-4234 (Sept. 22, 2008) (Decision and
Order), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0510094/080923ndsdo.pdf. But see
Dissenting Statement of Commissioner William E. Kovacic, In re Negotiated Data Solu-
tions LLC, FTC No. C-4234 (Sept. 22, 2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/
0510094/080122kovacic.pdf.
58 FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 393 U.S. 223 (1968); Atl. Refining Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357
(1965).
59 FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966).
60 Yamaha Motor Co. v. FTC, 657 F.2d 971, 981 (8th Cir. 1981).
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These results have not been for lack of trying. In the 1970s the Com-
mission premised several cases on distinctive Section 5 theories. Three
of these matters—Boise Cascade,61 Official Airline Guides,62 and Ethyl63—
resulted in court of appeals decisions. All were adverse to the agency.
The FTC also litigated and lost a case (Abbott Laboratories) in federal dis-
trict court in the mid-1990s.64 These federal court decisions in Section 5
cases reveal similar themes. In each instance, the tribunal recognized
that Section 5 allows the FTC to challenge behavior beyond the reach of
the other antitrust laws. In each instance, the court found that the Com-
mission had failed to make a compelling case for condemning the con-
duct in question.
In the more recent and in the more distant cases, one can suggest
several reasons for the reluctance of federal courts to sustain the FTC’s
Section 5 cases. The first is judicial concern about the apparent absence
of limiting principles. The tendency of the courts has been to endorse
limiting principles that bear a strong resemblance to standards familiar
to them from Sherman Act and Clayton Act cases. The cost-benefit con-
cepts devised in rule of reason cases supply the courts with natural de-
fault rules in the absence of something better.
The Commission has done relatively little to inform judicial thinking,
as the agency has not issued guidelines or policy statements that spell
out its own view about the appropriate analytical framework. This inac-
tivity contrasts with the FTC’s efforts to use policy statements to set
boundaries for the application of its consumer protection powers under
Section 5, which, since 1938, have supplemented Section 5’s prohibition
on UMC with a separate prohibition on unfair or deceptive acts or prac-
tices (“unfair or deceptive acts” or UDAP).
Another possible reason for judicial reluctance to endorse distinctive
FTC invocations of UMC authority is doubt about the depth and quality
of the agency’s expertise. To extend the reach of competition policy
beyond prevailing interpretations of the other antitrust laws, the Com-
mission arguably needs to persuade judges that the agency knows where
it is going and has a sound conceptual and empirical basis for the steps
it wishes to take. If courts perceive that those foundations have not been
set, they may be reluctant to take the Commission’s suggested path.
61 Boise Cascade Corp. v. FTC, 637 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1980).
62 Official Airline Guides v. FTC, 630 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1980).
63 E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984) (Ethyl).
64 FTC v. Abbott Labs., 853 F. Supp. 526 (D.D.C. 1994). The Commission proceeded
under Section 13(b) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. 53(b), added in 1975, and sought a perma-
nent injunction and disgorgement or restitution.
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In addition to addressing the history of judicial skepticism toward an
expansion of efforts to apply the UMC authority, the Commission also
must confront historical episodes of hostile legislative reactions to the
application of Section 5. In the 1950s and the 1970s, Commission efforts
to use Section 5 litigation to reach beyond prevailing interpretations of
Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act elicited strong political backlash
from the Congress.65 The very breadth of Section 5 creates political risks
in its application. The Commission always will face objections from re-
spondents in Section 5 cases that the agency is going beyond established
principles of antitrust doctrine—principles set in the resolution of Clay-
ton or Sherman Act disputes. To go beyond interpretations of the other
antitrust laws is a central aim of Section 5, but the act of doing so creates
immediate opportunities to scold the Commission for taking “unprece-
dented” measures or entering “uncharted” territory.
In a number of painful instances, these objections have resonated
with Congress. In the early 1950s, Congress’s ire was aroused by the
Commission’s successful challenge to base point pricing in the Cement
Institute case, and the legislation that Congress passed (and President
Truman vetoed) focused on that narrow issue.66 In the 1970s, a wide
range of competition (and consumer protection) initiatives included
UMC challenges to collective dominance in the breakfast cereal and pe-
troleum sectors; that time, legislation that Congress passed (and Presi-
dent Carter signed) restrained numerous aspects of the agency’s
authority.67 In each of these instances, a major theme of the attacks was
that the Commission was purporting to use its elastic mandate to assert
unlimited control over the conduct and structure of American industry.
65 William E. Kovacic, Congress and the Federal Trade Commission, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 869
(1989); William E. Kovacic, The Federal Trade Commission and Congressional Oversight of Anti-
trust Enforcement, 17 TULSA L.J. 587, 625–27, 666 (1982) [hereinafter Congressional Oversight
of Antitrust Enforcement].
66 See Kovacic, Congressional Oversight of Antitrust Enforcement, supra note 65, at 625–27.
John Blair, who headed the FTC’s Bureau of Economics in the early 1950s, wrote in 1964
that “[t]he agonies that the Commission went through in trying to justify its attack upon
the basing-point system . . . left a scare which will long remain.” John Blair, Planning for
Competition, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 524, 525 (1964). Blair’s prediction came to pass. To abate
congressional outrage at the Cement Institute decision, the Commission forswore future
efforts to address base-point pricing and similar arrangements except through the appli-
cation of traditional Sherman Act concepts. These concessions came back to haunt the
agency in 1979 in the Boise Cascade case, where the court of appeals cited the agency’s
representations to Congress soon after the Supreme Court issued its Cement Institute opin-
ion as a factor weighing against the application of Section 5 to condemn the respondents’
parallel, independent adoption of delivered pricing systems. Boise Cascade, 637 F.2d at
576.
67 Id. at 630–67.
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III. THE PATH AHEAD
The unfair methods mandate that appears in Section 5 of the FTC Act
is one of the Commission’s distinctive institutional elements.68 To say
that it has no role in the elaboration of competition doctrine and policy
is to call into question a major basis for the agency’s formation. The
dramatic narrowing of the zone of enforcement in modern abuse of
dominance jurisprudence provides a good reason to reexamine pos-
sibilities for the application of this policy instrument.
Yet there is no point in considering an expansion of Section 5 en-
forcement to address single firm conduct unless one devises a strategy
that rests upon an accurate diagnosis of past Section 5 enforcement fail-
ures and corrects them. The FTC must explain why things will be better
the next time. The path ahead requires several steps.
1. Use a Policy Statement or Guidelines.
The first institutional predicate is for the Commission to articulate, in
a policy statement or guidelines, its views about what constitutes an un-
fair method. Such an articulation should describe how the agency will
exercise its enforcement discretion and, beyond that, set forth a high-
level framework for analyzing Section 5 cases in adjudication. This ap-
proach parallels that which the Commission took in 1980 to secure its
consumer protection authority (then under substantial question from
Congress).69 A comparable UMC policy statement might set forth a simi-
larly high-level test, broad enough to encompass specific (and in many
cases unanticipated) conduct as it arises. The recent FTC workshops on
unfair methods of competition provide one source of insight for this
undertaking.
Without clearly defined analytical concepts and implementing tech-
niques, the Commission runs a serious risk that courts will simply default
to existing Sherman Act Section 2 standards, and the elastic properties
of Section 5 will not be realized in practice.
68 Others include its multi-member and bi-partisan composition; its authority to con-
duct adjudicative hearings; its combination of investigatory, reporting, and litigation func-
tions; and its combination of competition and consumer protection missions.
69 FTC Policy Statement on Unfairness (1980), appended to Final Order, Int’l Harvester
Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1070 (1984), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-un-
fair.htm. The principal section of that text was characterized as a “Commission Statement
of Policy on the Scope of the Consumer Unfairness Jurisdiction.”
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2. Articulate a Framework that Accounts for Similarities to, as Well as
Differences from, Other Antitrust Laws
The second institutional predicate is to account (preferably in a pol-
icy statement or guidelines), for the similarities between a stand-alone
UMC case and a Sherman Act case, as well as the differences between
the two. The Commission must confront these issues directly. In cases
that fit squarely within a Sherman Act framework, the Commission has
relied, and will continue to rely, on Sherman Act precedent and modes
of analysis. When the Commission seeks to move beyond Sherman Act
precedent, or to have its evidence evaluated on a standard unique to
Section 5, a court will almost inevitably look to the similarities and dif-
ferences noted above.
The similarities will likely turn on commonalities with other antitrust
laws. We believe that UMC should be a competition-based concept, in
the modern sense of fostering improvements in economic performance
rather than equating the health of the competitive process with the well-
being of individual competitors, per se. This limitation does not reflect
early Commission precedent; before 1938, the Commission routinely
challenged such practices as deception, lotteries, and commercial brib-
ery as unfair methods.70 This limitation, further, does not reflect indica-
tions in the legislative history of the 1938 legislation, which gave the
Commission UDAP authority, that the new authority would not lessen
the agency’s UMC authority.71 Nor does this limitation take full advan-
tage of the assertion in S&H that the Commission could use its UMC
authority to reach practices outside both the letter and spirit of the anti-
trust laws. We think the early history is now problematic, and we view the
relevant language in S&H with skepticism.
S&H challenged the firm’s efforts to stop “exchanges” that dealt in its
trading stamps as commodities. The administrative case challenged the
practice as anticompetitive, but the Commission had shifted ground
before the case reached the Supreme Court. In accepting the Commis-
sion’s far-reaching arguments, the Court not only referred approvingly
to the pre-1938 precedent discussed above; it also criticized a 1931 deci-
sion, which held that the Commission could challenge trade practices
only where they injured “present or potential rivals,” as one of the cases
that “so straitjacketed the FTC that the Commission could not issue a
70 See, e.g., Circle Cilk Co., 1 F.T.C. 13 (1916).
71 See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 75-221 (1937) (UDAP authority would allow the Commission to
protect the public, even when competitors are not entitled to protection because they
engage in similar practices).
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cease-and-desist order prescribing even an immoral practice.”72 It cited
approvingly a 1934 decision that concluded that UMC could be found
in the sale to children of penny candy because it tempted children to
gamble and compelled more scrupulous competitors “to abandon their
scruples.”73 When it remanded the case for the Commission to make
new findings, the Court said that the agency might show “effects on
competitors because of considerations other than those at the root of
the antitrust laws,” and “noncompetitive” injury.74 The best reading of
the case is that, in 1972 as much as in 1938, the Commission could use
UMC to challenge such practices as deception and commercial brib-
ery—in essence, to make UDAP cases virtually a subset of UMC cases.
It is hard to reconcile this broad approach, which addresses the im-
port of UMC for challenging “immoral” practices, with the post-S&H
evolution of UMC and UDAP authority. UDAP authority has increas-
ingly focused on a harm-based test, and subordinated the fuzzier no-
tions of “immorality” that S&H seemed to approve as a factor in the
context of both competition (as noted above) and consumer protection
(as reflected in a 1964 Commission statement).75
UMC authority, both in the occasional stand-alone Section 5 cases
and in the more common Section 5 case premised on a Sherman Act
theory, has focused on the pricing and output effects associated with
competition law. While the Court had used the mantra of “protect[ing]
competition, not competitors” before S&H,76 it did not apply the under-
72 FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 241–43 (1972) (discussing FTC v.
Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643 (1931), with disapproval).
73 Id. at 242–43 (discussing FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bro., Inc., 291 U.S. 304 (1934), with
approval).
74 Id. at 247, 248.
75 In discussing unfairness (and clearly referring to UDAP and, perhaps, to UMC as
well), S&H cited with approval the 1964 Statement of Basis and Purpose for the Commis-
sion’s Cigarette Rule. That Statement identified three factors that could support a finding
of unfairness: consumer injury, public policy, and whether a practice is unethical or un-
scrupulous. Statement of Basis and Purpose, Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and Label-
ing of Cigarettes in Relation to the Health Hazards of Smoking, Statement of Basis and
Purpose, 29 Fed. Reg. 8324, 8355 (1964). The Commission’s 1980 unfairness statement
clarified that the unethical/unfairness test was not an independent basis for unfairness;
focused on a more precisely defined injury test, and retained a public policy component
while tethering it to injury (public policy could sometimes be the sole basis for finding
injury). FTC Policy Statement on Unfairness (1980), supra note 58, at 1070. Further, when
Congress codified the standard in 1994, it retained the injury test and a more limited
public policy test, with the qualification that public policy “may not serve as a primary
basis” for finding unfairness. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n).
76 See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962). The Court’s Brown
Shoe decision used this phrase twice—once in a general discussion about the aims of Sec-
tion 7 of the Clayton Act and again in a passage that ultimately endorsed the application
of Section 7 to preserve a more egalitarian business environment even at the occasional
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lying principle to create the doctrine of antitrust injury until fifteen
years later, in 1977.77 However intertwined UMC and UDAP may have
been in the past,78 today they are essentially complementary.79 The in-
creased analytical precision of both, moreover, affords the Commission
greater credibility with a reviewing court. For all of these reasons, we
doubt that a UMC holding will have much credibility if it falls outside
the “spirit” of the antitrust laws. Further, although the spirit of those
laws is not necessarily limited to the sort of pricing and output effects
associated with modern antitrust doctrine, the Commission will have a
rough road to travel, and be in particularly compelling need of a policy
with clear limiting principles, if it moves beyond those effects.
All of this looks to the first part of a possible framework, which would
examine the similarities between a stand-alone UMC theory and other
antitrust laws. The second part of this framework would focus on the
difference between the two. In the simplest cases, the difference could
be a straightforward legal hurdle, as when Section 5 allows a challenge
to a business that proposes to a rival firm that they fix prices, regardless
of whether the rival agrees to do so. This course of action would not
support a claim under Section 1 of the Sherman Act because it lacks the
statutory predicate of an agreement, and it could not hope to support
an attempted monopolization count absent suitable market share. How-
ever, the case is so straightforward, under the facts described above, that
the conduct might constitute virtually a per se violation of Section 5.
In more challenging cases, particularly those involving abuse of domi-
nance, the Commission might attempt to premise Section 5 enforce-
ment expressly on considerations of institutional comparative
advantage. As Dan Crane has observed, developments in federal court
litigation, particularly in private lawsuits, have illuminated the impor-
tance of choosing the correct institutional platform to resolve difficult
issues of competition law and policy.80 The FTC’s institutional features,
including Section 5, might supply a means of avoiding the pitfalls that
cost of efficiencies that a challenged merger might produce. GELLHORN ET AL., supra note
21, at 45–47.
77 See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
78 Into the 1970s, for example, deception cases often pled both UMC and UDAP viola-
tions. See, e.g., Creative Replacements, Inc., 88 F.T.C. 347 (1976) (Complaint) (hair re-
placement implant system).
79 Although some cases may implicate both, in our view UMC doctrine should no
longer subsume all unfair or deceptive acts (as it did from 1914 to 1938), nor should
UDAP doctrine subsume all unfair methods (although it could be argued that every well-
conceived competition case satisfies the statutory standard for unfairness).
80 FTC Workshop on Section 5 of the FTC Act as a Competition Statute, supra note 5, at
73–80.
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judges associate with the litigation of private antitrust disputes in the
federal courts. This rationale could be presented front and center as a
basis for applying Section 5, and it might be premised on two broad
aspects of the FTC Act: The Commission’s expertise, and the relatively
limited implications of a Section 5 violation (at least under Federal
law81).
The challenge is to identify specific problems with private litigation—
the Supreme Court has been quite explicit in citing some82—and to ex-
plain why, in a particular case, administrative enforcement should
trouble a reviewing court less than would private litigation.
One possibility is to develop a rationale for what Former Commis-
sioner Tom Leary calls “frontier” cases,83 which announce a new princi-
ple that could apply under Section 2, but which is ready only for Section
5 prospective enforcement but not the prime time of Section 1 or 2. In a
frontier case, the Commission would presumably find (and a reviewing
court would presumably affirm) all the elements of a Sherman Act viola-
tion; the difference between Section 5 and the Sherman Act would be
inherently transitory. The logic here would be that the Commission’s
institutional expertise provides a basis to announce a legal principle and
impose equitable relief at the outset; then, once the principle is an-
nounced, its subsequent application could be entrusted to Sherman Act
enforcement with the accompanying treble damages. The challenge to
this approach, though, is to make it work in practice: for a court to an-
nounce a decision under Section 5 without providing a precedent for a
plaintiff to use when it seeks to persuade a different court to impose
treble damages for prior conduct.84
81 See supra note 54.
82 See, e.g., Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Commc’ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109, 1120–22
(2009) (appropriateness of judicial administration of certain remedies); Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007) (noting costs of allowing discovery to proceed in an
antitrust case); Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S.
398, 408, 414 (2004) (noting risk of false positives); Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v.
Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 279–84 (2007) (noting, and finding particularly significant in a case
involving the role of antitrust in the regulated securities industries, problems posed by
non-expert and generalist judges, non-expert juries, and the risk of antitrust mistake).
83 See Thomas B. Leary, A Suggestion for the Revival of Section 5, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Feb.
2009, http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-source/09/02/Feb09-Leary2-26f.pdf); see also
Susan B. Creighton & Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Appropriate Role(s) for Section 5, ANTITRUST
SOURCE, Feb. 2009, available at http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-source/09/02/Feb09-
Creighton2-26f.pdf.
84 To the extent that the institutional concern with Sherman Act enforcement derives
from the fairness of imposing treble damages for violating a (perhaps unanticipated) bus-
iness norm, the optimal result could be to make the conduct subject to treble damages
only after the Commission had enunciated the relevant standard—presumably not before
the Commission filed its complaint, and perhaps not before it issued a litigated order or
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Alternatively, the Commission could argue, in specific contexts, for
less transitory differences between Section 5 scrutiny and Sherman Act
scrutiny. Gap-filling cases, like the clear-cut invitation to collude cases
noted above, fit squarely within this description. What else might?
Focusing either on the Commission’s expertise, the relatively limited
consequences of Commission action, or both, perhaps if might be ar-
gued that certain types of matters involve such fact-specific complexity
that they should be reserved for Section 5. Or perhaps it might be ar-
gued that a particular element of proof needed to show a Sherman Act
violation is unnecessary, or could be relaxed, for purposes of Section 5.
The Commission might assert, for example, that, where an element of a
Sherman Act test looks to a likelihood of anticompetitive effects, the
Commission might establish a lower threshold of likeliness for purposes
of Section 5.85 Similarly, perhaps the Commission might argue, when
the parties raise a specific defense to a Commission action, that a differ-
ent threshold should apply under Section 5. (The latter might apply, for
example, when respondents rely on the state action doctrine, a species
of what Susan Creighton and Tom Krattenmaker call “yes, but” cases86).
Under any of these, the Commission should be prepared, as noted
above, to articulate the standard that it proposes to adopt. To the extent
that that standard differs from the standard applied under the Sherman
Act, moreover, the Commission will likely encounter the skepticism it
encountered in the 1980s unless it can persuasively explain those differ-
ences and, in particular, can tie them to one or more unique attributes
of Section 5.87 On the other hand, this poses challenges of its own. For
even before that order was subject to judicial review. (Less common situations, such as an
unappealed decision of an administrative law judge or a Commission decision for which
respondents did not seek judicial review, would raise additional questions). Even if the
optimal time to start damages could be identified it would be hard for a court that found
a violation in a later Section 2 case to limit damages appropriately.
85 An analogy would look to the way that (at least in theory) Section 7 of the Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. 18, sets a threshold that reaches any transaction whose effects “may be
substantially to lessen competition or to tend to create a monopoly.”
86 In other words, these are cases where yes, the challenged conduct is anticompetitive,
but no, it does not violate the law because of a doctrine that trumps antitrust concerns.
Creighton & Krattenmaker, supra note 83.
87 To this end, we note that, to the extent an argument relies on the FTC’s expertise (as
opposed to the more limited consequences of a Section 5 violation), such an argument
will be more persuasive when the Commission uses it to consider issues that draw on the
Commission’s core expertise in analyzing competition issues, rather than to require the
Commission to balance competition concerns against values outside its core expertise in
competition (or consumer protection) matters. Further, it is more persuasive when the
Commission uses administrative litigation, or seeks a preliminary injunction in support of
administrative litigation, than when it seeks a permanent injunction, since the latter case
the Commission is not functioning, and does not anticipate functioning, as an adjudica-
tive decision maker.
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example, this rationale would require the Commission to encourage, or
at least invite, a reviewing court to find that challenged conduct does
not violate Section 2. Needless to say, this might not be popular, among
other quarters, with the Antitrust Division.
3. Build Institutional Competence
Finally, the third foundation is to build the FTC brand for institu-
tional competence. This means using research, workshops, reports, and
related policy instruments to signal to the courts that the FTC has a
sound basis for specific proposed applications of Section 5. The Su-
preme Court’s decision in Cement Institute, which sustained the Commis-
sion’s finding of an infringement, emphasized the agency’s previous
research and development in this area. Such investments may well be
seen by courts as providing assurance that the steps proposed by the
Commission are wise and worthy of support.
IV. CONCLUSION
Section 5 is important to the FTC in theory, but efforts to implement
it have seen only limited success in practice. Future efforts to develop
Section 5 jurisprudence must account for these past problems, if the
Commission is to attain better results the next time. The Commission
needs to articulate, perhaps through a policy statement prior to litiga-
tion, the basis on which it intends to proceed. That basis, moreover,
should focus on the similarities between the proposed Section 5 theory
and a Sherman Act theory (why is it essentially a competition-based the-
ory?), as well as the differences (why should a violation be found under
Section 5 but not under the Sherman Act?).
